In the first post on this topic I wrote about why a two-state solution is probably impossible. My conclusion there: Even though political orthodoxy tells us that the creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel is the only way forward in the Middle East, that scenario has very little chance of being implemented at this point in time, and as such, some kind of democratic single-state arrangement might be inevitable.
It is worth bearing in mind that the current reality is already a one-state reality, though not a democratic one. Around 10 million people live under the rule of the State of Israel. But only about seven million of those people have the rights entailed in citizenship. The others are ruled over without having the right to participate in the political institutions that govern their lives.
The moral argument for one democratic state over one undemocratic state is an obvious one. Although security for Jewish Israelis is a real concern (just as the security of Arabs is), after denying an entire population its basic rights ‘temporarily’ for forty-plus years, largely on 'security grounds', it is no longer possible to justify the status quo as a 'temporary' set of measures. Palestinians, as human beings, have basic rights. They deserve citizenship. Maybe the day will soon come when an independent Palestinian state can grant them that citizenship, and the rights that come with it. If not (and, as I've already said, I don't think that is likely), then we have a choice: Apartheid or Equality.
I know which option I prefer.
I’d like to make another claim though: Despite the tendency amongst many people—especially those who identify with the pragmatic Zionist 'centre'—to dismiss any bi-national arrangement as 'national suicide' or as blindly unrealistic, I do think that there are a number of advantages to a one-state arrangement over the consensus two-state option. I say this cautiously: I recognise that there are some big risks involved. I also recognise that a one-state arrangement—even a one-state democratic arrangement—can be realised in many ways, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. Nevertheless, because this option is considered taboo in some circles, I wish to outline some potential advantages that this kind of set up (whether it be a bi-national state, a federation or some other kind of arrangement) might offer.
I want to emphasise: I am not claiming that these potential advantages necessarily make a bi-national state preferable. The potential benefits may or may not outweigh the dangers. But I am saying that: (i) I don't think that discussion of this topic should be taboo; I reject the suggestion that a one-state democratic arrangement is an extremist position; and (ii) Since the kind of political arrangement under discussion here may well be inevitable, even opponents ought to examine the potential benefits so that if and when a one-state democracy comes about, they will be able to work to at least ensure that the positive aspects are not undermined.
So, here goes:
Equality. In a one-state set up, everyone has citizenship. Every person can vote in the national elections that determine the make-up of the government whose organs have a large degree of influence on his/her daily life. Everyone has a stake in the army, the foreign service, the health system, the education system—and these services are there for the good of all. And anyone, if unsatisfied, can raise her voice in protest and vote for an alternative. In a two-state reality some of the above is unlikely to be true: The disengagement from Gaza demonstrated that Israel can retain control of important aspects of Palestinian life even after withdrawal. And even the Geneva Accords leave much of Palestinian life in Israel's hands (for example, through demilitarisation).
(Relative) neutralisation of extreme ideological groups. Some have argued that in coming to a resolution between Israel and the Palestinians, ideological divides are the bigger challenge. The practical logistics, no matter how complicated, will be solved; but ideologies need to be changed or abandoned in order for a resolution to be reached. I've already argued against this simplistic approach to the practical side of things. I also disagree with the second part of the claim: that ideologies can smoothly change in the way that the two-state camp has often argued must take place.
It is highly, highly unlikely that religious Zionists on the far right will be able to simply reconfigure their belief system around a partitioned Eretz Yisrael. The passion that has for decades infused the settlement movement and the opposition to any territorial withdrawal, as well as the fact that such a significant percentage of this demographic lives over the green line, make the possibility of a withdrawal something that much of this group cannot countenance and will oppose passionately, perhaps violently. In addition, a somewhat wider group of religious political parties—including Shas and Yahadut Hatorah—promote visions of Israel as an ethno-religious Jewish state, whilst also traditionally opposing withdrawal from settlements.
What is my point? That some of the most ideological and passionate groups and political parties in Israel are opposed more passionately to withdrawal and partition than to anything else. They don't necessarily love the idea of a bi-national democracy either—most would probably openly prefer apartheid—but it is, perhaps, a solution that they would be able to live with, to accomodate ideologically. The far-right (especially the religious far-right), in other words, might oppose giving Palestinians the vote. But they likely wouldn't come out against it in droves in the same way that they came out to oppose uprooting their own communities from Gaza.
So too on the Palestinian side. Hamas and many ideological Muslims are interested in one, Islamic state in all of Palestine. Ideally. Occupation obviously runs counter to this, as does partition, which would mean that the control of a significant percentage of the land is in the hands of 'infidels.' That is a difficult pill to swallow, ideologically. So is the notion of living as a minority within a democratic state that is not run according to the principles of Islam. But the latter is something that religious Muslims deal with in other places. Some of them like it, some don't, but it is something that can be and is lived with.
Which brings me to the related matter of new political configurations. For those who would prefer to see a state which is truly democratic, a bi-national state has the advantage of rendering the moderate majority the most powerful political force. In both Israeli and Palestinian politics, religious fundamentalists have significant—and increasing—political power. And their respective visions, of course, conflict with one another. In a state in which the political divide is no longer about whether or how the land will be divided—because everyone is already a citizen—supporters of Fatah and Kadima, for example, suddenly seem like potential (if initially uncomfortable) political allies; democratic political parties interested in fostering the institutions of a healthy state that respects the rights of all of its citizens. Religious and other extremist parties will not be able to bully their agendas through, because they will have become a minority force.
Even if Hamas gets 50% of the Arab vote, for example, that would still only amount to 25% of the electorate. And unlike the secular-democratic parties, who will be able to cross ethnic/national lines in order to further a common political/social agenda, Jewish and Islamic fundamentalists have very different visions of what they would like the state to look like. This would likely mean that they, like everyone else, would have to shift their agendas: Instead of attempting to influence the character of the entire state in a way that imposes their respective religious visions on others, they will need to take up the (noble) agenda of working to protect the religious and other rights of their respective constituents. Obviously, not everyone will agree with me that this kind of change is desirable. But for those of us—religious and secular—who believe that religion and the state are bad for each other, who are worried by the rise of religious extremism—especially in the political realm, and who would like to see a strong, moderate centre with genuine political cooperation between Jews and Arabs, a democratic bi-national arrangement has the potential to do much good.
The ability of different groups to retain their historical narratives is another important potential difference between one-state and two-state arrangements. The Jewish people has a millenia-old connection to Eretz Yisrael, both as the object of yearnings from afar, and as a place in which Jewish communities existed throughout the ages. That connection is tied up with the whole land, and includes many specific places that are on the 'other side' of the green line. This, of course, is something that the right has said for a long time; those on the left have often responded that there are more important values at hand that need to be considered. That might be true. But even so, severing the Jewish connection with, say, Hebron, with its ancient significance and which had a Jewish community long before the arrival in Palestine of the Zionists, is a difficult and traumatic prospect.
The Palestinians, of course, also have strong bonds with the whole land. This is true not just at an abstract historical-national level, but also at an individual and familial level. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians left or were expelled from the nascent state of Israel in 1947-8. Their families are from towns, villages and cities—some of which are still standing, others that are not—to which they today have no access and to which they would not ever be able to return under a two-state arrangement.
In one democratic state, people would be able to live wherever they choose, within the limits of the law. No need for Jews to make up new stories in order to convince ourselves that Hebron is not central to our history or that Tel Aviv is ancient. And no need for Palestinian refugees to be told that the towns from which their families came are off-limits to them eternally; that their family bond is somehow not real, and that their 'right of return' is only to the West Bank.
Another significant advantage that is worthy of mention is pre-existing infrastructure. No doubt, incorporating two national groups into one democratic framework is not a simple thing to achieve. But neither is creating a new state from scratch. Israel already has a state infrastructure in place. It has also absorbed large numbers of new citizens in the past, and even already has some aspects of a bi-national infrastructure in the institutions that already (under)serve the Arab public within Israel. Expanding membership to this club would change its character drastically, and would require monumental expansion and adjustment; but it would not require the creation from scratch of the infrastructure of a new state, nor would it necessitate complex, detailed border arrangements between two utterly artificial political entities within one geographical area.
Institutional solidarity and individual relationships are the last two advantages that I'll mention here. The fact that state institutions—including the police, the ambulance service, and yes, the army—would be shared, has the potential to foster a shared sense of solidarity and even pride. Yes, there are many potential problems to be overcome in creating, for example, one combined army. But the result, over the years, of people having to work together in such frameworks, could be the creation of new symbols, 'language' and shared identity around which people could unite—in addition to, not instead of, existing identities. And of course, unlike a two-state solution, in one state there would be increased, rather than decreased, interaction between Jews and Arabs—both in day-to-day life and in forced contexts such as the army. Bear in mind that for the last eight years it has been illegal for Israelis to enter Palestinian-controlled areas, resulting in very limited interpersonal interactions. A reality in which people can and do interact with each other is likely to be one in which personal relationships are formed, and in which demonisation of the 'other' is (more) limited.
So there you have it. Some potential benefits of a one-state arrangement in Israel/Palestine. Once again: Yes, there are dangers. Yes, there are disadvantages. Yes, maybe the dangers and disadvantages outweigh the potential gains. But maybe they don't. And even if they do, maybe such an arrangement is coming our way regardless, in which case we may as well prepare ourselves to make it work as best we can.
Much has been written about the downsides of a one-state arrangement, and I don't feel the need to address them: some are legitimate concerns, others have more to do with paranoia or racism. But there is one concern that I do want to deal with: the claim that giving citizenship to Palestinians and thus forming a bi-national state would mark the 'end of Zionism'. Jewish nationalism can and should survive and even thrive in a bi-national state. More on this next time..
It is worth bearing in mind that the current reality is already a one-state reality, though not a democratic one. Around 10 million people live under the rule of the State of Israel. But only about seven million of those people have the rights entailed in citizenship. The others are ruled over without having the right to participate in the political institutions that govern their lives.
The moral argument for one democratic state over one undemocratic state is an obvious one. Although security for Jewish Israelis is a real concern (just as the security of Arabs is), after denying an entire population its basic rights ‘temporarily’ for forty-plus years, largely on 'security grounds', it is no longer possible to justify the status quo as a 'temporary' set of measures. Palestinians, as human beings, have basic rights. They deserve citizenship. Maybe the day will soon come when an independent Palestinian state can grant them that citizenship, and the rights that come with it. If not (and, as I've already said, I don't think that is likely), then we have a choice: Apartheid or Equality.
I know which option I prefer.
I’d like to make another claim though: Despite the tendency amongst many people—especially those who identify with the pragmatic Zionist 'centre'—to dismiss any bi-national arrangement as 'national suicide' or as blindly unrealistic, I do think that there are a number of advantages to a one-state arrangement over the consensus two-state option. I say this cautiously: I recognise that there are some big risks involved. I also recognise that a one-state arrangement—even a one-state democratic arrangement—can be realised in many ways, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. Nevertheless, because this option is considered taboo in some circles, I wish to outline some potential advantages that this kind of set up (whether it be a bi-national state, a federation or some other kind of arrangement) might offer.
I want to emphasise: I am not claiming that these potential advantages necessarily make a bi-national state preferable. The potential benefits may or may not outweigh the dangers. But I am saying that: (i) I don't think that discussion of this topic should be taboo; I reject the suggestion that a one-state democratic arrangement is an extremist position; and (ii) Since the kind of political arrangement under discussion here may well be inevitable, even opponents ought to examine the potential benefits so that if and when a one-state democracy comes about, they will be able to work to at least ensure that the positive aspects are not undermined.
So, here goes:
Equality. In a one-state set up, everyone has citizenship. Every person can vote in the national elections that determine the make-up of the government whose organs have a large degree of influence on his/her daily life. Everyone has a stake in the army, the foreign service, the health system, the education system—and these services are there for the good of all. And anyone, if unsatisfied, can raise her voice in protest and vote for an alternative. In a two-state reality some of the above is unlikely to be true: The disengagement from Gaza demonstrated that Israel can retain control of important aspects of Palestinian life even after withdrawal. And even the Geneva Accords leave much of Palestinian life in Israel's hands (for example, through demilitarisation).
(Relative) neutralisation of extreme ideological groups. Some have argued that in coming to a resolution between Israel and the Palestinians, ideological divides are the bigger challenge. The practical logistics, no matter how complicated, will be solved; but ideologies need to be changed or abandoned in order for a resolution to be reached. I've already argued against this simplistic approach to the practical side of things. I also disagree with the second part of the claim: that ideologies can smoothly change in the way that the two-state camp has often argued must take place.
It is highly, highly unlikely that religious Zionists on the far right will be able to simply reconfigure their belief system around a partitioned Eretz Yisrael. The passion that has for decades infused the settlement movement and the opposition to any territorial withdrawal, as well as the fact that such a significant percentage of this demographic lives over the green line, make the possibility of a withdrawal something that much of this group cannot countenance and will oppose passionately, perhaps violently. In addition, a somewhat wider group of religious political parties—including Shas and Yahadut Hatorah—promote visions of Israel as an ethno-religious Jewish state, whilst also traditionally opposing withdrawal from settlements.
What is my point? That some of the most ideological and passionate groups and political parties in Israel are opposed more passionately to withdrawal and partition than to anything else. They don't necessarily love the idea of a bi-national democracy either—most would probably openly prefer apartheid—but it is, perhaps, a solution that they would be able to live with, to accomodate ideologically. The far-right (especially the religious far-right), in other words, might oppose giving Palestinians the vote. But they likely wouldn't come out against it in droves in the same way that they came out to oppose uprooting their own communities from Gaza.
So too on the Palestinian side. Hamas and many ideological Muslims are interested in one, Islamic state in all of Palestine. Ideally. Occupation obviously runs counter to this, as does partition, which would mean that the control of a significant percentage of the land is in the hands of 'infidels.' That is a difficult pill to swallow, ideologically. So is the notion of living as a minority within a democratic state that is not run according to the principles of Islam. But the latter is something that religious Muslims deal with in other places. Some of them like it, some don't, but it is something that can be and is lived with.
Which brings me to the related matter of new political configurations. For those who would prefer to see a state which is truly democratic, a bi-national state has the advantage of rendering the moderate majority the most powerful political force. In both Israeli and Palestinian politics, religious fundamentalists have significant—and increasing—political power. And their respective visions, of course, conflict with one another. In a state in which the political divide is no longer about whether or how the land will be divided—because everyone is already a citizen—supporters of Fatah and Kadima, for example, suddenly seem like potential (if initially uncomfortable) political allies; democratic political parties interested in fostering the institutions of a healthy state that respects the rights of all of its citizens. Religious and other extremist parties will not be able to bully their agendas through, because they will have become a minority force.
Even if Hamas gets 50% of the Arab vote, for example, that would still only amount to 25% of the electorate. And unlike the secular-democratic parties, who will be able to cross ethnic/national lines in order to further a common political/social agenda, Jewish and Islamic fundamentalists have very different visions of what they would like the state to look like. This would likely mean that they, like everyone else, would have to shift their agendas: Instead of attempting to influence the character of the entire state in a way that imposes their respective religious visions on others, they will need to take up the (noble) agenda of working to protect the religious and other rights of their respective constituents. Obviously, not everyone will agree with me that this kind of change is desirable. But for those of us—religious and secular—who believe that religion and the state are bad for each other, who are worried by the rise of religious extremism—especially in the political realm, and who would like to see a strong, moderate centre with genuine political cooperation between Jews and Arabs, a democratic bi-national arrangement has the potential to do much good.
The ability of different groups to retain their historical narratives is another important potential difference between one-state and two-state arrangements. The Jewish people has a millenia-old connection to Eretz Yisrael, both as the object of yearnings from afar, and as a place in which Jewish communities existed throughout the ages. That connection is tied up with the whole land, and includes many specific places that are on the 'other side' of the green line. This, of course, is something that the right has said for a long time; those on the left have often responded that there are more important values at hand that need to be considered. That might be true. But even so, severing the Jewish connection with, say, Hebron, with its ancient significance and which had a Jewish community long before the arrival in Palestine of the Zionists, is a difficult and traumatic prospect.
The Palestinians, of course, also have strong bonds with the whole land. This is true not just at an abstract historical-national level, but also at an individual and familial level. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians left or were expelled from the nascent state of Israel in 1947-8. Their families are from towns, villages and cities—some of which are still standing, others that are not—to which they today have no access and to which they would not ever be able to return under a two-state arrangement.
In one democratic state, people would be able to live wherever they choose, within the limits of the law. No need for Jews to make up new stories in order to convince ourselves that Hebron is not central to our history or that Tel Aviv is ancient. And no need for Palestinian refugees to be told that the towns from which their families came are off-limits to them eternally; that their family bond is somehow not real, and that their 'right of return' is only to the West Bank.
Another significant advantage that is worthy of mention is pre-existing infrastructure. No doubt, incorporating two national groups into one democratic framework is not a simple thing to achieve. But neither is creating a new state from scratch. Israel already has a state infrastructure in place. It has also absorbed large numbers of new citizens in the past, and even already has some aspects of a bi-national infrastructure in the institutions that already (under)serve the Arab public within Israel. Expanding membership to this club would change its character drastically, and would require monumental expansion and adjustment; but it would not require the creation from scratch of the infrastructure of a new state, nor would it necessitate complex, detailed border arrangements between two utterly artificial political entities within one geographical area.
Institutional solidarity and individual relationships are the last two advantages that I'll mention here. The fact that state institutions—including the police, the ambulance service, and yes, the army—would be shared, has the potential to foster a shared sense of solidarity and even pride. Yes, there are many potential problems to be overcome in creating, for example, one combined army. But the result, over the years, of people having to work together in such frameworks, could be the creation of new symbols, 'language' and shared identity around which people could unite—in addition to, not instead of, existing identities. And of course, unlike a two-state solution, in one state there would be increased, rather than decreased, interaction between Jews and Arabs—both in day-to-day life and in forced contexts such as the army. Bear in mind that for the last eight years it has been illegal for Israelis to enter Palestinian-controlled areas, resulting in very limited interpersonal interactions. A reality in which people can and do interact with each other is likely to be one in which personal relationships are formed, and in which demonisation of the 'other' is (more) limited.
So there you have it. Some potential benefits of a one-state arrangement in Israel/Palestine. Once again: Yes, there are dangers. Yes, there are disadvantages. Yes, maybe the dangers and disadvantages outweigh the potential gains. But maybe they don't. And even if they do, maybe such an arrangement is coming our way regardless, in which case we may as well prepare ourselves to make it work as best we can.
Much has been written about the downsides of a one-state arrangement, and I don't feel the need to address them: some are legitimate concerns, others have more to do with paranoia or racism. But there is one concern that I do want to deal with: the claim that giving citizenship to Palestinians and thus forming a bi-national state would mark the 'end of Zionism'. Jewish nationalism can and should survive and even thrive in a bi-national state. More on this next time..
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