On attempting to nip a fledgeling state at the bud

For those who haven't already heard, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad recently released an official document, entitled 'Palestine—Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State', in which the basic principles are outlined for the development of infrastructure so that a Palestinian state can be established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip within two years. The document calls for the creation of the necessary infrastructure for a state, piece by piece. It calls for the cooperation and support of the international community. And it presents a vision of what the future Palestinian state should look like. Fayyad's opening letter sums up the aims of the program as follows (You can access the whole document here):

We look forward to continued regional and international support to establish Palestine as an independent, democratic, progressive, and modern Arab state, with full sovereignty over its territory in the West Bank and Gaza, on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital. Palestine will be a peace-loving state that rejects violence, commits to co-existence with its neighbors, and builds bridges of cooperation with the international community. It will be a symbol of peace, tolerance and prosperity in this troubled area of the world. By embodying all of these values, Palestine will be a source of pride to all of its citizens, and an anchor for stability in this region.

The plan presents a 'vision' of a future Palestinian state as a democratic country run according to the rule of law, respecting human rights, and living in peace with its neighbours. Lest the message against the common claim that 'there is no Palestinian partner' not be heard, the plan is explicit:

We are a partner for peace. Like all other peoples of the world, we aspire to live in peace, secure prosperity for our people, and bring stability to our region. But, like all peoples, we also seek justice. This cannot be achieved unless our people attain their legitimate, national rights as prescribed by international resolutions and implicit in the two-state solution. The PNA has made remarkable progress in establishing the rule of law and delivering public services under the occupation regime and in spite of the obstacles it has constructed. For its part Israel must immediately begin dismantling these obstacles, which undermine PNA’s efforts. Israel must dismantle the infrastructure of the occupation and create the space for international efforts to reach a just and lasting peace.

The plan is unreserved in its calls for an end to the occupation of territories captured by Israel in 1967; and it calls for an end to Israeli measures that are preventing Palestinians from achieving their basic rights. But at the same time, it takes the initiative for creating Palestinian institutions into Palestinian hands, calling for the establishment of the necessary institutions for a future state already now, before the state's establishment (sound familiar?). The plan goes into great detail, outlining, amongst other things, the responsibilities of individual ministries, from the Justice Ministry to the Central Bureau of Statistics. Here, for example, is an excerpt from the description of the Ministry of Education:

The Ministry of Education (MoE) has the following objectives:
Provide opportunities to access and benefit from the ‘Education for All’ Program through:
 Building classrooms throughout the occupied territory.
 Providing text books, stationery and equipment.
 Ensuring an appropriate learning environment for persons with special needs.
 Supporting education in Jerusalem.
 Providing loans to enable students to enrol in higher education.
 Encouraging enrolment at vocational and technical educational centers.
[…]

So what we have, then, is a call for opposition to the Occupation through the establishment of the institutions of a state; institutions whose purpose is to create the framework for a future independent, democratic Palestine. This state is described as a right. And the plan calls for its establishment—with or without the consent of Israel.

What is the official Israeli response to this plan so far? From Ha'aretz today:

Lieberman: Israel won`t let Palestinians declare state unilaterally

Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman on Monday declared that Israel would not stand by idly should Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad go ahead with his stated plan to declare a de-facto state within two years. Lieberman told visiting UN envoy Tony Blair and European Union's foreign policy chief Javier Solana that such unilateral initiatives did not contribute to the creation of positive dialogue and vowed that Israel would respond.
[...]

Read the rest here.

Not-so-veiled threats seem to be the order of the day (well, the order of most days... see the Swedes last week) for our beloved Foreign Minister.

Some thoughts:

Many Israelis and Zionists like to claim that this whole big Middle Eastern mess is all the fault of the Arabs, who decided to meet our declaration of independence in 1948 with hostility. That response, it is argued, was an immoral and unjustifiable reaction to our self-evidently peace-loving desire to establish an independent state. So this leads me to ask two questions:

Question 1: If we had the right to establish a state unilaterally, with the agreement of the international community but without the agreement of most of the population of Palestine/Eretz Yisrael at the time, why don't the Palestinians have that same right?

Question 2: If, on the other hand, we have the right, as suggested by Lieberman, to respond to the unilateral declaration of Palestinian independence with violent opposition, why did the Arabs not have that same right in 1948?

These are not (just) rhetorical questions. Responses are invited.

Yeshayahu Leibowitz on the coming of Mashiach

'Belief' without believing:

In Support of One State in Israel/Palestine (Sort of) – Part I

This is something that has been brewing for a while in my mind. It increasingly seems to me that, for a number of reasons, a 'two-state solution' is, at this point, almost impossible. We're in a rather paradoxical situation: One one hand, accepted orthodoxy—in Israel and abroad, although perhaps a little less so amongst Palestinians—says that those who support compromise and are in favour of resolving the conflict must support a two-state agreement. Yet at the same time, some of the key issues that would need to be resolved in an agreed-upon manner by the two relevant parties are, it seems, no longer resolvable (if indeed they ever were).

Here are a few central examples:

1) Jerusalem

It is clear that there cannot be a two-state solution—one that involves a viable Palestinian State alongside a secure Israel, as they like to say—without Jerusalem being the capital of both countries. There are plenty of Israelis (such as our current Prime Minister) who pay lip service to the idea of a two-state arrangement whilst at the same time insisting that Jerusalem remain undivided, under Israeli sovereignty. This is a delusional position—there is no way that any Palestinian leadership can or will agree to this. For there to be a two-state solution, Jerusalem must either be divided, or it must be shared.

The problem is, either sharing the city or dividing it in two would be a practical nightmare. Division is problematic because of the mess of overlap between Jewish and Arab population—especially in light of the fact that, as a result of the building of Jewish neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem since 1967, nearly half of the population of the Eastern part of the city is now Jewish. Add to that the difficulties involved in managing an international border in the cramped confines of the old city, and division seems altogether unimplementable. Remember: politicians and generals can write documents about the delicate, refined details of every piece of fence, every gate, door, road, guard-post. But in reality, these details need to be managed by regular people, of various degrees of competence and goodwill. The more intricate the plan, the more that can go wrong. And what can go wrong, will go wrong.

An open Jerusalem that is shared by two states is similarly problematic. Assumedly, a real border would divide the two states everywhere outside the holy city. That being the case, how would Jerusalem be set up so that people living in the mixed city can travel freely to their own state but not to the other? Theoretically, checkpoints could be set up at every entry and exit to Jerusalem, to ensure that Israelis don't travel without permission from Jerusalem into Palestine, and that Palestinians cannot freely enter Israel without passing a 'border'. But then what we would have is not an open city, but an utterly closed one, surrounded by border-crossings/checkpoints on all sides; a city that would be cut off in a serious way from all of its surrounds.

We have a problem, then. If a two-state solution is the only compromise/agreement that can be seriously discussed, and a two-state solution requires the division or sharing of Jerusalem, but both of these are impossible, what happens then?

2) Jewish Settlements in the Occupied Territories

There are today nearly half a million Jewish settlers living in the West Bank—around 200,000 in neighbourhoods in Israeli-annexed East Jerusalem, and approximately 275,000 in the West Bank 'proper'. For a two-state solution to come into effect, one that includes a viable Palestinian state that Palestinians would be able to accept, the areas in which most of these settlements are situated would not be able to remain under Israeli sovereignty. Many Israelis advocate a Palestinian state in borders that would allow large 'consensus' settlements to remain a part of Israel—in some cases, this is realistically conceivable, through a land swap arrangement of some kind. But many large settlements—such as Ariel, for example, are located deep within the territories, far from any future border. Their location was designed precisely to prevent the establishment of a viable, contiguous Palestinian state. A two-state solution would require that these settlements either come under Palestinian sovereignty—with all that that entails; or that they be evacuated.

Once again, neither possibility seems realistic. The settlement enterprise, in a sense, has achieved its goal—the West Bank egg cannot be unscrambled. Residents of settlements that were established precisely to retain Israeli control over territories are not going to accept a reality in which they are forced to become minority citizens of a Palestinian state. And mass evacuation, although morally justifiable (settlers moved to these places knowing full well that they were under dispute and that eventual evacuation was a possibility), is fraught with difficulties. In 2005, in the lead-up to the disengagement from Gaza, the religious-Zionist right demonstrated the force and presence that it can muster in opposition to withdrawal from territories. Thousands rallied; activists went from door to door convincing people to oppose the withdrawal, and with a good degree of success. (Though the mobilised activists were largely opposed for ideological reasons, they were able to convince a much larger slice of the population that withdrawal was a bad idea on pragmatic and security grounds).

Gaza was peanuts in comparison to what would have to happen in the West Bank for a two-state arrangement to come about. Gaza was outside the national consensus for a long time, contained no holy places with the religious and historical baggage of places such as Hebron (the Cave of the Patriarchs) and Bethlehem (Rachel's Tomb), and had a settler population that was relatively small. It will not be difficult for the religious-right to mobilise once again against any potential comprehensive agreement. And this time around it will be far easier: one need only convince a potential opponent of one problematic aspect of a far-reaching withdrawal in order to get her onside. And most Israelis, including left-wing Israelis, have never been in favour of a full withdrawal anyway, so convincing them shouldn't prove too difficult. Add to this the fact that there is a much larger number of settlers in the West Bank than there were in Gaza (even if only a minority of settlements need to be evacuated, the number is still much larger than Gaza), and the places of religious and historical significance—some of them deep in the heart of populated Palestinian areas—and it seems unlikely that majority support could ever be achieved, let alone maintained for long enough to actually carry out a withdrawal. And in addition to the above, of course, is the huge trauma involved in uprooting—rightly or wrongly—a population that includes whole communities, many of whom were born and raised over the green line and have never lived anywhere else.

It is inconceivable that the Palestinians would formally agree to statehood on anything less than the 1967 borders (perhaps with some adjustments based on a one-for-one land-swap). But for that to happen there must either be a withdrawal of thousands of Israeli citizens, or those citizens—many of whom identify with the far-right, would have to come under Palestinian sovereignty. Both situations seem, at this point, highly unrealistic.

3. Refugees

A two-state solution, of the kind regularly discussed in Israel and abroad, implies the existence side by side of a Jewish Israeli state and a Palestinian state. For those who define the 'Jewishness' of Israel in terms of its demographics (more on this another time), a Jewish majority is necessary if Israel is to remain both 'Jewish' and 'democratic'. On the other hand, a central part of the Palestinian narrative is bound up with the exile of hundreds of thousands of refugees in 1947-8—a population whose descendants count in the millions—and their right, at least in theory, to return to the homes that they left. As we saw in the failure at Camp David in 2000, Palestinians are unlikely (or unable) to give up on this core belief no matter what their leaders agree to, and as such their leadership cannot and will not back down from this demand. The stories of the hundreds of thousands of refugees have infused the lives of their families, communities and society for decades, and these stories cannot be erased. Yet, an agreed-upon two-state solution relies precisely on an abandonment of this longing, so that Israel can remain—in theory and in practice, a 'Jewish State' with an ensured Jewish majority. Agreement on this issue is necessary for a final settlement. Such agreement seems impossible. So in this case too, the so-called 'consensus' solution requires the (probably) impossible in order for agreement to be reached.

So what now?

I still don't think that the possibility of a two-state solution is yet absolutely dead. I even still mildly prefer it, in the short term, to the alternatives. BUT I think that such an arrangement cannot and will not come about bilaterally, simply as a result of negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. The gaps are too wide, and the lack of any balance of power means that so long as the gaps remain, Israel will continue to enforce the status quo. Real agreement between the sides is impossible, certainly under this government, and likely under any other as well. Unilateralism also doesn't work, as we saw in Gaza, where the withdrawal was interpreted by extremists as victory, on the one hand, and imposed a reality on Palestinians in which they had no real say, on the other. One-sided Israeli 'solutions' by definition will not create any kind of balanced or just arrangement, because they are formulated in line with Israeli interests alone. But perhaps there is a chance that a two-state 'solution'—one that both sides are uncomfortable with—might be imposed by outside powers, most likely including the US. This is highly unlikely but not impossible. For it to work, Israel as well as the Palestinians would have to be pushed into steps that do not have popular support; but it would be the outside power that would be blamed for these injustices by Israelis and Palestinians alike. Again: highly unlikely, but not totally impossible. And if something along these lines doesn't happen during Obama's administration, then it will probably never happen.

Which leads me to the possibility of a one-state arrangement—one state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea in which every resident, Jew and Arab, Israeli and Palestinian, is an equal citizen. If a two-state solution is not imposed in the next few years, then a one-state arrangement of some kind is inevitable, and even desirable in comparison to the alternative—indefinite continuation of the current reality in which one people has ruled over another for decades. I'm going to write two more posts related to this topic: (1) The ideological changes that I think need to take place in Israeli society, and amongst Jews outside of Israel, in order to prepare for the possibility of a bi-national state—whether it is desirable or not; and (2) The reasons that I think a one-state arrangement in Eretz Yisrael/Palestine may actually be advantageous, at least in some respects.

About the Blog

The blog's name is inspired by (or rather, a somewhat belated response to) the famous words of Judah Leib Gordon, the Lithuanian maskil: "Be a Jew in the home and a man in the street!"

I am a Jew, in the world, with some opinions about stuff. I prefer to blog semi-anonymously, at least for the time being. Jerusalem is the place that I (mostly) call home, though I can often be found in various other parts of the world. I can be reached off-blog at ajitw2 -at- gmail.